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Abstract 
The paper challenges the orthodoxy of current critical readings of the European crisis 
which discuss the failings of the EU in terms of the triumph of “neo-liberalism”. 
Defending instead a liberal view on international migration, which stresses the 
potentially positive economic, political and cultural benefits of market-driven forces 
enabling movements across borders, it details the various ways in which European 
regional integration has enabled the withdrawal of state control and restriction over 
certain forms of external and internal migration. This implementation of liberal ideas 
on the freedom of movement of persons has largely been of benefit for migrants, 
receiving and sending societies alike. These ideas are now threatened by democratic 
retrenchment. It is Britain, often held up as a negative example of “neo-liberalism”, 
which has proven to be the member state most fulfilling the EU's core adherence to 
principles of mobile, open, non-discriminatory labour markets. On this question, and 
despite its current anti-immigration politics, it offers a positive example of how 
Europe as a whole could benefit from more not less liberalization. 
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 The Fourth Freedom: 
Theories of Migration and Mobilities in “Neo-Liberal” Europe 
 
Marxist and social democratic commentary on the EU has converged in the years 
since the 2005 constitutional vote and the 2008 global financial crisis on a “neo-
liberal” interpretation, that castigates “free market” driven European integration as the 
“wrong Europe”, undermining principles of democracy, justice and/or community that 
may -- perhaps -- still be better protected at the national level (Anderson, 2009; 
Schulz-Forberg and Stråth, 2010; Crouch, 2011; Streeck, 2013; Schmidt and 
Thatcher, 2013; Hall and Lamont 2013). Defending arguments about the desirability 
of well regulated, labour protecting institutions at the national level against so-called 
“Anglo-Saxon” or “Anglo-American” liberalism, their implicit normative models 
discount or overlook migration and mobilities as a now core structural feature of all 
European societies; and something much better handled in more open labour markets 
such as Britain, than in more closed ones such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
or Denmark. Scholars of international migration and mobilities, meanwhile, cannot 
share the hostility to one of the main consequences of liberalizing (i.e., reducing state 
control of) labour markets internationally. They would generally see the consequences 
of “free market” migration in terms of diversification of society and cultural change 
as progressive. Nor can they agree that the presence of informality rooted in cross-
border economic activities or the avoidance of state oversight is inherently bad: 
transnational and unregulated “ethnic economies” are celebrated as a crucial means by 
which migrants establish a financial foothold in contemporary societies. Are 
progressive-minded migration scholars thereby part of the “neo-liberal” conspiracy 
promoting the domination of “market fundamentalism” (Peck, 2010)? 
I address this theoretical question by focusing on the one innovative dimension of 
market freedom created by the EU in contrast to other regional market integration 
projects such as NAFTA: the “fourth freedom”, of free movement of persons. After 
first contrasting basic marxist and liberal positions on international migration in 
analytical terms, I go on to argue how since 2004, under certain conditions, market-
driven migration and mobilities in Europe have fulfilled the promise of an ideal 
liberal economic theory of migration: where migrants, receiving states and sending 
states, accepting migration according to the canonical EU legal/economic principles, 
have all been “winners”. Moreover, I challenge head-on the limitations of the “neo-
liberal” interpretation of the present European crisis by heading straight to the alleged 
greatest culprit: Britain, the heartland of the supposedly “neo-liberal” “Anglo-Saxon” 
free market model undermining the potentials of a democratic, progressive European 
Union. On the contrary, I argue that the best illustration of EU ideals as well as the 
potential all round benefits of the fourth market freedom has been Britain in the 1990s 
and 2000s. On this dimension -- the egalitarian openness and dynamism of its labour 
market -- Britain has long been the most highly Europeanized, or EU integrated, 
member state. Amidst the current crisis, Britain's potential vote on EU membership, 
and its apparent growing political hostility to the very migration and mobilities that 
drove its recent boom years, would therefore also be a vote about the future of 
freedom of movement of persons in Europe: the one progressive dimension of 
European economic integration that has done the most to break down nationalist 
barriers, mentalities and seclusions. 
 
Negatives and positives of economic migration 
Left-wing critics of “neo-liberal” Europe mischaracterize or ignore the progressive 
dimensions of its market-driven regional integration because of an unadmitted 
Marxist, or at least strongly marxisant, tendency in recent debate. Straight Marxists 
should have no problem knowing where they stand on international labour markets; 
that is, open migration across national borders driven by economic dynamics. Markets 
are for marxists essentially the root of evil; the fact that the labour being alienated is 
an African escaping from poverty does not change the fact that in selling themselves 
to international labour market demand they are selling themselves into wage slavery. 
Contemporary globalization, particularly in the light of the current crisis, has thus to 
be seen as deeply negative in its consequences (Castles, 2011; De Genova and Peutz 
2010). Critical opinion routinely cites the “polarization” effects of globalization: with 
elite capitalists enjoying the benefits of a free flowing world, while exploiting low 
end, mainly service sector, migrants. International justice in a Marxist world might at 
some utopian point in the future necessitate abandoning oppressive nation-state 
borders, but this is not aided by the border busting movement of individuals driven by 
unhampered (what will be called “neo-liberal”) forces of capital. An older marxist 
literature bluntly also considered in negative terms the conflict they would bring to 
existing labour-capital settlements (Castles and Kosack, 1973). Similarly, marxists 
cannot support informal economic activities which seek to avoid the taxation and 
regulation that pay for communitarian re-distribution and labour protection. The 
“illiberal” upshot has to be that states (i.e. national governments) should control and 
regulate borders: that is, restrict or prevent these (poorer) foreigners with intentions of 
working and settling from crossing them, thereby protecting migrants from 
exploitation and developing states from loss of human capital, and protecting insider 
workers from labour market and wage competition or a dilution of their citizenship 
privileges. Marxists, strongly communitarian social democrats as well as nationalist 
conservatives may indeed converge on the justice of state restriction of open 
migration on these grounds (Miller, 2000). Outside of this, progressive views which 
wish to sympathize with the attempts of the poorer workers of the world to move -- 
and hence the benefits and desirability of international migration within a more 
globalizing world -- will have to settle for some or other view of international labour 
markets that is basically “liberal” in some way. 
In contrast, the liberal position is that states do not have an unquestioned sovereignty 
on whether they may restrict labour migration (Hollifield, 1992). A case can be made 
for limiting state governance, either when open migration is of overall benefit for all 
in utility (i.e., economic) terms; or because of the stronger claims of a human right to 
move over citizens' rights to restrict access to their community; or -- in the special 
case of an integrated regional labour market -- because there is an equity-based 
principle of non-discrimination making it illegal to disfavour foreigners in 
employment contracts. Some go so far as to argue for completely open borders on 
humanitarian and global justice terms, or to compensate for the arbitrary accident of 
birth (being born Congolese rather than British) (Carens, 1987); and further support 
can be taken from arguments about the beneficial effects of international diversity in 
promoting more tolerance or cosmopolitanism (Papastergiadis, 1999). Opposing the 
idea that national citizenship gives special privileges to insiders in a territory to 
restrict the access of others, liberal support for open borders breaks open the “state 
monopoly on the freedom of movement” that was one of the great social disciplining 
achievements of nation-state building and consolidation of the late nineteenth century 
and early twenieth century (Torpey, 2000). 
For sure, for liberals international labour markets can be, often are, indeed perhaps 
mostly are negative, empirically speaking: that is, liberals may recognize the kind of 
points marxists would make, that labour markets can be exclusionary or exploitative. 
In exclusionary labour markets, discrimination (i.e., racially or ethnically based) leads 
the market to systematically categorise, restrict and shuffle migrants into badly paid, 
low status jobs (the secondary labour market), failing to recognize skills and 
qualifications, or imposing glass ceilings and barriers to getting jobs in the primary 
labour market (i.e., full time, secure, unionized and regulated work status) (Piore, 
1989). In exploitative markets, these exclusions lead to the migrant worker failing to 
earn the salary they are due, systematically being underpaid. This can be accompanied 
by an inefficient mismatch of actual skills and qualification to demands in the host 
labour market (Waldinger, 1999). 
But whereas for a Marxist the very notion of alienated wage labour is anathema, for a 
liberal, the critique of an inefficient or unjust labour market presupposes its opposite: 
that a non-exclusionary, non-exploitative -- and therefore non-coercive -- market is 
possible. State intervention is justifiable, but only in order to correct situations where 
there is clear market failure. This leaves the way open to the liberal belief that it is 
state borders -- including the kind of internal borders favouring insiders on the labour 
market -- that may be the problem here. A more rather than less open international 
labour market may, under certain conditions, bring more benefits to all -- the migrant, 
the receiving state and even the sending state: in terms of social mobility and the 
circulation of human capital, skills and education; the complementary filling of 
sectoral demand (in the case of jobs not taken by native workers) and/or the 
entrepreneurial creation of new employment niches by business-minded migrant 
workers; and (in some cases) the circulation of capital back to the sending state 
(through remittances, return investment) (see Light and Gold, 2000). 
Much of the debate in migration theory therefore is not about the general desirability 
of migration -- most migration scholars tend to be liberal on whether states should 
restrict free movement -- but to what extent better state regulated (i.e., managed) 
migration might temper the possible negative consequences of completely 
unregulated (informal) migration (Koser, 2007). On this, the most familiar scenario 
internationally is a far from optimal: the clearly hypocritical “smoke and mirrors” 
type political economy, which mixes political bluster about controlling or stopping 
migration -- mostly symbolic actions designed at policing the borders (military 
operations and fence construction) -- with tacit acceptance that domestic labour 
markets desperately need a constant supply of cheap, easy to hire and fire (informal) 
markets to do all the dull, difficult and dangerous work required (Massey et al., 2002). 
This has long been the scenario in the USA as regards Mexican and Central American 
migration; for all the anti-immigration rhetoric there is massive labour market demand 
in the USA for fruit pickers, domestic workers, cleaners, and fast food attendants, and 
the state tacitly allows US economic interests, favouring migration, to call the shots; 
there is much to suggest that Europe's Southern borders work similarly (Samers, 
2004). The recent tendency in the last decade to stage more overt enforcement at these 
two sets of borders only underlines the hypocrisy more. 
Again, though, there are potentially better managed alternatives, in which the state 
can be engaged in facilitating various kinds of wanted migration and free movement -
- even cultivating laissez-faire attitudes to certain forms of migrant mobility and 
entrepreneurship -- while trying to limit the extent to which the migration is governed 
by untamed market forces alone. This is signalled by the notion of “managed 
migration”, at the centre of most applied policy debates about migration 
internationally. The problem with “smoke and mirrors” policies is that coupling 
laissez-faire with heavily securitized borders tends to lead to the rise of mafia-like 
migration businesses, in which bosses (patrón) collude with traffickers (coyote, or 
migrant agents) to secure the exploitable labour they crave (Krissman, 2005). What is 
often forgotten -- again with all the emotiveness of migration control and policing 
issues -- is that at any given border, even some of the most restrictive such as the US-
Mexico border, the amount of cross-border “migration” daily (formal or informal) is 
dwarfed by the vast number of other border crossings linked to trade, the movement 
of goods, commuting, tourism, shopping, temporary stays, and so on (Pastor, 2001). 
In the name of better trade relations, liberal states may enable and often cut loose all 
of these “mobilities” (Urry, 2007) under the rubric of free movement, thus operating a 
lighter hand in controlling migration. Somewhere, there may be an optimal balance to 
be found: in which a flow of positive labour migration, driven by economic supply 
and demand, is openly allowed and recognized by the state, while negative migration 
(those proven to be harmful to migrants and/or unwanted by the host society) is 
minimalized. 
 
Migration in the European Union 
What do critics of “neo-liberalism” have to say about these issues? Debates on the 
political economy of “neo-liberalism” mainly focus not on the migration of labour or 
freedom of movement of persons, but on the injustices that have followed the removal 
of state control or governance over the three other “core” freedoms of movement -- of 
capital, goods and services -- as part of the rampant global era of the 1980s, 1990s 
and 2000s. These variously include the triumph of financialisation, the rise of 
unaccountable transnational corporations, the cutting of welfare states and protective 
legislation, and the growing inequalities between super-elites and the rest of the 
population. Much of the ire expressed by critics centres on how the liberal “freeing” 
up of market forces, justified by aggregate measures of growth and production, has 
seen the benefits accrued and monopolized by a narrow band of large-scale, 
internationally evasive, corporate interests. It is also a top down story: governments 
and bureaucracies are seen to be part of these same elites, and in cahoots with the 
corporations. The “roll back” is then not an abdication of power; it is also the 
aggressive use of state power in the name of an “anti-state” philosophy and economic 
theory -- the “roll out” of neo-liberal policies (Peck, 2010). Extending this to the EU, 
in recent work on the allegedly neo-liberal underpinnings of the European integration 
project by Anderson (2009), reprised by Schulz-Forberg and Strath (2010), and 
Streeck (2013), it has been argued that the idea of the European institutions's elite 
autonomy from democractic governance at the national level can in fact be traced to 
the high priest of neo-liberalism, Hayek. 
Where these critics of neo-liberalism address the question of labour, it is always to see 
it as another abstract factor of production in the throes of the same neo-liberal logic. 
The varieties of capitalism literature thus sets up a negative, reified “Anglo-
American” model, supposedly ascendant against a “continental” one (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001), anchored in a Keynesian social democratic past, whose welfarist 
provision and legislation protecting workers was embedded in older national social 
compromises that emerged from conflicts between capital and labour. Neo-liberalism 
is apparently sweeping these away -- with the EU as the primary source of these 
reforms at the national level. When alternatives are imagined -- for example, in 
Esping-Andersen’s defence of a Nordic system (1999) -- they are idealized versions 
of nationalized political economies, in which (democratic, communitarian) politics 
curb markets through the decommodification of service provision, particularly child 
care and household work, which is sustained as a highly paid, regulated and taxed 
sector (Esping-Andersen then complains that his dry cleaning or a haircut costs him 
two or three times more in Copenhagen than New York!) As this suggests, the 
missing part of Esping-Andersen's brilliant, albeit imaginary Danish model, is the 
structural role of migration and migrants in all post-industrial economies today. The 
comparative varieties of capitalism literature continues to theorise (continental) 
European economies -- i.e. labour markets -- as if they can be nationally self-
contained. Any migration is minimal or discounted as a factor. The stylisation is that 
we find migrants driving down service sector protection (and prices) in the US, but 
not in Europe today -- except, perhaps, in the Americanized “Anglo-Saxon” Trojan 
horse economies (Britain and Ireland). 
Yet migration across all of Europe is far from being a peripheral or exogenous factor: 
it is in fact the structural component of all European economies which -- in Europe as 
America -- allows the middle classes the life (and the service sector provision) they 
enjoy, as much as the central flow of new human capital keeping these economies 
fluid and dynamic. Migrants take the dirty, dangerous and dull jobs that nationals do 
not want; they work in sectors where social protection or labour benefits are scarce. 
Migration everywhere has thus moved to become a central structural feature of late 
capitalist societies juggling the legacies of social democracy with global capitalism. 
Even in Denmark, there is a sizeable black market in some sectors of the economy; 
where there is not, migrants are peripheraliszd and caricatured in populist terms and 
openly discriminated against in terms of non-recognition of skills and qualification. In 
a similar case, the Netherlands, a further symptom sees migrants forcibly “integrated” 
into national cultural and linguistic norms as a condition of labour market 
incorporation. At the same time, informal migrant organization and entrepreneurship -
- much of it transnational in basis -- cut across these forced nationalizations. For much 
of the rest of the continent, then, the late 1990s and 2000s saw a remarkable 
liberalization of the international labour market in many sectors, particular in services, 
that has seen the emergence of significant transnational economic spaces across 
Europe. Certainly, the informal scope and entrepreneurial nature of Southern Europe 
enabled migrant workers to find a place in the economy to an extraordinary degree; 
even corporatist France and Germany shifted in these informalizing directions, while 
retaining sclerotic labour markets in some sectors -- particularly in the heavily 
pensioned public sector, closed off to youth as much as foreigners. Anything that 
might be said about Britain or Ireland, therefore, as a migration destination in these 
respects is far from exceptional; rather they are setting a structural norm that most of 
Europe is following. 
Critics, of course, may just see all this as evidence of “neo-liberalism” triumphant. 
But labour here is not just a blind factor of production enabling capital to profit and 
escape state control; at least not in anything other than a hard-line structuralist 
Marxist view. Migrant labour also has agency, and experiences the benefits of social 
mobility relative to countries of origin; it brings change to the system from below 
(Smith, 2001). Particularly, the inevitable transnationalism of migrants in informal 
economic spaces undermines and subverts the pretentions of states to re-impose 
national welfarist governance (Faist, 2000). Marxisant scholars have often dealt with 
this challenge by a shift to Foucauldian territory: the apparent agency and 
individualism of the migrant and mobile work force is just a mark of how well the 
global capitalist system now produces easily exploitable “flexible”, hyper-mobile, 
adaptable “subjectivities” attuned to a neo-liberal world (Mitchell, 2003). Market 
freedoms are but a mark of a higher level form of state-disciplinary 
“governmentality”, albeit now located at a “post-national” European level (Jensen and 
Richardson, 2003). 
Outside the dismal ontology and epistemology of Foucauldian Marxism -- which 
renders any modern form of individual freedom impossible, as well as being wholly 
unfalsifiable in its logic -- there remains a need to assess the negative or positive 
impact of free movement of persons within the changing European migration system. 
The critique of “neo-liberalism” appears insensitive to the patent ways in which 
freedom of movement of persons might not lead to the same consequences as the free 
movement of capital, goods or services -- for the migrants, as much as the receiving 
and sending economies. 
Responding to the inequities of the emerging European migrant system, the European 
Union -- far from only unleashing free market forces, or moving towards a purely 
American model -- has in fact sought to create conditions in which an optimal liberal 
outcome is possible. An alternate view of migration in Europe can thus be made by 
looking at different dimensions of the EU's attempt to develop policies that respond to 
the post-national scale of international labour markets no longer contained in their 
logic or substance by national borders. 
Regarding migration from outside the EU, in search of a more optimal and just policy 
beyond “smoke and mirrors” logic, the European Union has officially made a great 
investment in the idea of “managed migration”. Again, while much of the focus in 
academic debate has been on the failures and harshness of the restrictive regime to the 
South, European migration policies have also quietly smuggled in much more 
enlightened notions into the external partnership policies to the East and selective 
Southern states. In these agreements, improved trade relations and agreements on 
possible future membership negotations have been accompanied by free movement 
accords or visa-free travel for different categories of person (for example, tourists, 
students and business movers). The goal is to liberalize top-down control and enable 
more open, back and forth-type borders rather hostile closed ones, which tend to have 
the negative informal effects detailed above. The nature of Europe's relations with, 
say, Morocco, Turkey or Ukraine has thus changed over the years in a liberal 
direction, albeit tentatively. Although these countries participate heavily in the 
conditional security and control operations, the migration regime has overall been 
liberalized. Similar effects for Romania and Bulgaria preceded their accession (Jileva, 
2002). The external policies amount to a concentric expansion of the realm of 
European integration beyond its internal borders, creating incipient new market-based 
rights to residents derived from the four freedom market principles of the European 
Union. Under the right conditions, there will also be development benefits to the 
sending state; migration becomes governed more by demand and the choice of 
migrants to move or engage in economic activity. 
These points are certainly empirically controversial. Turks in Europe, for example, 
feel indignant about persistent restrictions; but this is because they already sense they 
have justifiable rights and claims in the European territory derived from the market 
integration logic -- they are already able to travel, study and work in Europe in 
unprecedented numbers. Prima facie it certainly cannot be denied that the EU 
scenario vis-à-vis the migration chances of its near neighbours certainly looks better 
than the “smoke and mirrors” scenario in the US-Mexico case. Damning criticism of 
the “neo-liberalism” of NAFTA does not simply translate into the European scenario 
without ignoring one side of the story about European borders (as does Rumford, 
2006). 
The impact of the idea of freedom of movement of person outside the strict territory 
of the EU is one of the most surprising dimensions of the European integration 
project, albeit equivocal. Internally meanwhile, it is the very hallmark of why the EU 
is not like NAFTA or other purely top down “neo-liberal” regional integration 
projects. The fourth freedom makes all the difference: the fact that all citizens of the 
European Union are in principle free to move live, study, work, retire in other 
member states -- subject only to economic demand in another member state. They 
enjoy equality of employment, and rights of non-discrimination; they can study at the 
same cost, or (as workers) claim the same benefits as residents; they even have 
incipient political rights. The progressive reading likes to accent the more political 
and societal ambitions of these rights (Maas, 2007), or attribute them to human rights 
(Soysal 2012); the fact is they are firstly grounded in market building principles (the 
EU's distinctive political economy), even if they allude in some ways (certainly not 
truly Marshallian) to a kind of European citizenship. The vast majority of Europeans 
using these rights are economic migrants: i.e. workers from both higher and lower 
sectors of the economy, to which can be added the individualistic choices of students 
and retirement migrants. Free movement of persons, which dates back to the insistent 
position of the Italians in negotiations about the Euroepan community in the 1950s, 
would be a radical concept in a Europe restricted to core economically rich states; yet, 
every successive accession has seen these rights extended eventually to new and often 
much poorer member states. By early 2014, nearly all transition barriers were down to 
the East and Central European member states; even Romania and Bulgaria. In theory, 
but also substantially in practice, this is a liberal migration dream scenario. There are 
no visas; there are no quotas or bizarre entry categories to fulfil; and even in non-
Schengen countries, there are only the most perfunctory controls on cross-border 
movement. There is no visa scrutiny or application procedure preceding the move: 
you can just get on a plane or a train. The daily scene at Stansted Aiport says it all: 
dozens of flights pouring in from Poland or Southern Europe, just as the outbound 
flights take British residents off to their second home or back to see their families for 
the weekend. 
Some may want to call this kind of thing “neo-liberal”, and to see the free choices of 
European citizens as nothing more than the expression of disciplined “subjectivities” 
coerced by illusory notions of individual flexibility and mobility; but it has to be 
admitted that the effects of this part of regional integration -- or European 
globalization, if that's what it is -- have been quite different to the effects of other 
freedoms of movement. Firstly, there is a light albeit marked evidence to show that 
unlike in open globalization -- which is dominated by arguments on how mobility has 
become an index of growing inequality -- in European free movement the 
opportunities and effects are massifying (expanding) downwards, albeit partially, 
from top to bottom. European migrations are a mass middle-class phenomenon: 
characterized typically by educated, upwardly mobile or “spiralist” movers (those 
socially ascending from provinces to cities) (Recchi and Favell 2009). European free 
movement have provided many more mobility opportunities for middle classes; not 
just elites. This includes far more than those who move physically. Even for the much 
bigger majority of European middle classes that don't, European mobilities are having 
a considerable impact on their daily lives in terms of the experience and organization 
of their everyday lives: expanding social networks, wider travel experiences, the 
mobility of their children as students, financial mobilities, knowledge of other 
countries; it is, also, interestingly associated with growing cosmopolitanism (Mau, 
2010). One can agree with Fligstein (2008) in aggregate terms that it is upper and 
middle classes who have more benefitted more from European integration - hence his 
“Euroclash” over the EU's legitimacy -- but the people for whom their lives have been 
changed most radically by Europeanization (and the regional elements of 
globalisation) are relatively speaking lower down the class scale -- via new but 
increasingly banal consumer possibilities, travel, holidays, routine knowledge of 
foreign places, and so on (Mau and Verwiebe, 2010). In terms of sending countries, 
self-selection has tended to put talented, adventurous, pioneering types on the road; 
there is certainly a danger of brain drain in many cases. On the receiving end, 
however, the benefits of such migration cannot be doubted: it is the most realistic 
vision of how the 2000 Lisbon Agenda could be fulfilled in terms of creating a 
Europe of maximixed skill and knowledge in a dynamic, specialixed economy. 
This progressive case for the effects of West European migrations can be contested 
empirically (Favell and Recchi, 2011). But the impact of Europe's extension to the 
East in these socially transformative terms is stronger. Here, the impact is bigger 
because it is also geo-political; soldering a new Europe across the massive divisions 
of the past. Europe has also seen a much larger scale migration of these citizens, 
driven by individual choice (to move), and market demand (selection of destination); 
highly educated or skilled migrants, facing low returns to these skills in their home 
countries, the migration also had positive self-selection effects. This holds positively 
in comparison to the much less open or liberal North American regime, with its 
perverse restrictions on skill and talent, its alphabet soup of visa categories, and its 
tendency to favour lower quality family reunification over selective self-motivated 
migration (Borjas, 1999). For sure, East and Central European member states face a 
sharp danger of brain drain; however, in an open borders scenario, the migration is 
more likely to lead to circulatory and pendular migration, with high levels of 
remittances and return investment, particularly since so much of the migration activity 
is entrepreneurial in character (Morawska, 2002). With longer-term settlement less 
likely as long as borders are easy and open (and cheap airlines plentiful), there are 
also fewer long-term family-related costs for receiving countries. 
Faced with these theoretical and at least partially substantiated empirical views of the 
positive effects of the liberal idea of free movement on European migration and 
mobilities, social democrats should feel discomfort. Marxists cannot but see these 
trends as negative: this is where the reliance on the slogans condemning “neo-
liberalism” has made it easy. But can what they say about the free flow of capital, 
goods or services be applied to these apparent heroes and heroines of Europeanization 
from below? If the issue is national welfare states, then yes: open European migration 
can damage welfare states when they take jobs from natives, drive down wages, or 
undermine ties of community. These are Polanyi's “shiftless migrants” transforming 
the continent, as capital undoes the old coherence of political and social cohesion 
(Streeck, 2013). But how to assess the conflicting evidence about complementarity in 
labour markets, positive effects of entrepreneurship, positive trends in human capital, 
significant cultural effects of diversity, or boosts towards post-national 
cosmopolitanism? Polanyi is often cited in a marxisant way, but his view also allows 
for a liberal view, a positive potential balance between the competing poles of state, 
market and community (on this, see Caporaso and Tarrow, 2009). Could it be with 
internal European migration, the EU actually achieved or at least offered a glimpse of 
a new, plausible and defensible balance between growth, flexible labour markets, 
political control, and social cohesion, re-located at a new post-national territorial 
level, that renders nationalist welfare-state positions outdated? 
 
Britain as the future of Europe 
While the boom years held, this optimistic reading could certainly find some 
empirical justification. The question is now, how has the crisis changed all this? 
Without a doubt, liberal Europe -- the Europe of free movement that was ushered in 
by Delors in the 1980s, from the Single European Act, through Maastricht, to the 
single currency, the Lisbon agenda and treaty -- is in crisis. This much in the accounts 
of Streeck, Anderson and others is true. The issue of democratic deficit -- and the 
“Euroclash” -- sits at the heart of this. There has clearly emerged a popular resistance 
to the forces of post-national globalisation, expressed very clearly in the non and nee 
of France and the Netherlands in the constitutional referendum of 2005. These votes 
turned on middle class anxieties about the liberalization of the economy and the loss 
of national social and labour market protections. Critics of neo-liberalism call on 
democracy to be a bulwark to the consequences of an unfettered free market 
(Crouch,2011; Streeck, 2011). What this will mean in practice is a democratic 
reaction against freedom of movement of workers, which will close borders in 
Europe. Romanticism about “another Europe” is thus shot through with the same 
contradictions as the left wing “neo-liberal” interpretation: that it is possible to 
imagine a Europe somehow more attune to the demands of global justice, yet which 
has closed itself to the mobile factors of production and consumption that are most 
transforming the world elsewhere. This is particularly an unresolved contradiction in 
far left parties, who are emotionally cosmopolitan but viscerally nationalist in their 
conception of how markets are to be controlled or governed. The utopian solution of a 
European superstate which might engage in top down management of the economy or 
large scale redistribution in an up-scaled welfare state above all is a misconception of 
the progressive novelty of the EU, which lies rather in its promise of an unbounded 
cosmopolitan and post-national politics and society (Delanty and Rumford, 2005). 
Less not more state has been the EU's greatest achievement: bringing liberalism and 
individualism as an antidote to the deeply ingrained fascist impulses of European 
governments and (especially) bureaucracies (Mazower, 1998). 
With the struggling ratings in Eurobarometer, and democratic anti-EU unrest in many 
member states, it is surely right that a certain limit has been reached to European 
integration. Beyond this, the danger is surely a nationalist “roll back” of certain 
market freedoms. In February 2014, in a populist referendum, Switzerland, who were 
part of the open borders Schengen area, voted to curb freedom of movement and 
impose quotas on EU citizens working in the country. The next immediate threat in 
this sense is Britain, whose membership is very likely to come up for a vote in 2016 
or 2017. A rising, democratic, anti-free movement tide drives the anti-EU case. The 
present government is threatening to opt out of free movement accords entirely, 
raising the spectre of imposing quotas and visas, removing all non-discrimination 
clauses, and restricting benefits for EU citizens: there is surely nothing “neo-liberal”, 
let alone liberal, about this blunt reassertion of state sovereign power over borders, 
driven by populist appeal. 
Cameron's political gamble specifically brings into play the possibility of a decisive 
negative vote driven by the irrational misperception of the country's relationship with 
the EU, particularly a populist schizophrenia about the very freedoms of movement 
that the British economy perhaps best incarnates. Prior to the crisis, this could not be 
doubted. Britain's supposed distance to Europe -- even its peculiar self-construction 
that sees Europe as its other, that “place across the sea” -- is perverse given the 
obvious fact that Britain is more closely involved and connected with the rest of the 
continent that at any point in its modern history, and that it has benefitted hugely 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s as an off-shore member of the club; having all the 
benefits of membership with fewer of the collective costs. This applies as much to 
trade (both exports and imports) and foreign direct investment, as to the banal 
everyday way the British have integrated European experiences, knowledge and 
(especially) forms of consumption into their lives. And, more than anything, it ignores 
the absolutely extraordinary way in which Britain has absorbed massive and 
disproportionate amounts of internal European migration, creaming off labour market 
selection benefits at all levels of the economy. The willingness to receive European 
citizens as workers on legal terms is one important measure of European integration: 
on this dimension Britain can count as the most deeply integrated member state -- 
only paralleled by the willingness of its own citizens to take up free movement 
benefits of retirement migration and buying property abroad. What may be “neo-
liberalism” to some is also a mark of the market driven fluidity of a society that has 
been much less likely to use legal or illegal means to close the market, discriminate 
outsiders (via non-recognition of qualifications, parochialism, or cultural and 
linguistic barriers), or artificially protect the insider privileges of national citizens. 
In terms of migration, a strong case can thus be made that what happened in Britain 
corresponded rather closely to the ideal liberal migration theory under optimal 
regional integration conditions. It was the brightest and the best, those with talents 
and skills that might work in the entrepreneurial environment, who were drawn to 
Britain. With continental labour markets stagnant -- especially in countries like 
France or Southern Europe -- London became the Euro-destination of choice (Gordon 
et al., 2007). The youth of Western Europe could get work in London, and outperform 
natives. Their profile -- a high proportion in their twenties, almost all under 45, 
mostly highly educated, highly motivated -- made them perfect workers. The best 
years of their working lives were given to the hugely competitive London labour 
market. Longer term, there were few costs to the receiving society: a large proportion 
would not stay once they had families, relying on going back to the more protected 
welfare states and education systems of continental Europe (i.e., social dumping). A 
parallel dynamic applied to the much larger East European migration that followed 
the 2004 accessions. 
Given the numbers (well over 500,000 Poles in the first couple of years after 
accession, and large numbers from many other states), it is remarkable how long it 
took for any kind of significant political reaction. The migrants were given 
unquestioned labour market access, opportunities for niche sector entrepreneurship 
and received with equity by a market able to recognize the skills and talent on offer. 
And the migrants duly responded to this demand, by penetrating deeply many sectors 
of the economy (domestic work, household work, construction, hospitality and 
entertainment services, food service, transportation, agriculture.), much of it 
entrepreneurialism which created new jobs (Garapich, 2008). Unlikely any previous 
migration in modern Britain, they also penetrated widely out into provincial, small-
town Britain. 
It can argued that Britain's boom years were substantially fuelled by these European 
dynamics (Favell, 2008). But has this situation now changed? The sense of crisis has 
given the anti-immigration case a certain valency. But the point here is that from the 
anti-EU point of view, the question is not really empirical but symbolic and 
emotional. This has become increasingly clear in the government's inability to 
marshall any evidence that might be able to support its own official position that the 
decision should come down to the balance of national interest; i.e. that this question 
somehow does hang in the balance (Rigby and Parker, 2014). On the face of it, 
compared to most of Europe, Britain has suffered the depression less deeply and 
recovered more quickly -- for sure, monopolized by the London and the South East 
region which is most embedded in Europe. There has been some evidence of growing 
ethnic tensions over the presence of foreign Europeans, and certainly a growing 
awareness that some of the migration would have typical settlement consequences, 
particularly as it became progressively more difficult to come and go freely 
internationally. This lay the ground for the UKIP’s eventual ability to put a specific 
face on its Europhobia; but even in the years since the economic crisis -- in which 
there has been tougher labour market competition, shrinkage of business and 
increased likelihood of settlement -- there remain an certain abstractness to the 
hostility. Britain, as a whole, and the South East of England most strikingly, is a 
markedly more cosmopolitan place. The transformation -- mostly a Europeanization 
from below -- since the grim years of the 1980s is extraordinary. “Super-diversity” 
indeed sits well on its proudly established multi-racial history (Vertovec, 2007). 
The arguments above summarize an existing balance of evidence. On all these 
questions, there is now a furious debate, and there are certainly academic voices 
marshalling strong views on the anti-immigration side, right and left (Coleman, 2008; 
Goodhart, 2013). Meanwhile, the stakes involve a lot more than just the British 
population. Not only is the British European story one dramatically underplayed in 
the country itself; it is little recognized or understood on the continent, where clichés 
about its stripped-down, Americanized “Anglo-Saxon” economy abound. British 
openness to Europeans in its labour market and a certain degree of flexibility, flux and 
dynamism in an economy still structured significantly by social democratic legacies, 
might be argued as a model sorely needed elsewhere in Europe. Those countries 
which most closely align to the liberal market model within a social democratic 
framework, the Netherlands and Denmark, are -- unfortunately and not coincidentally 
-- also the ones with some of the worst track records on crude anti-immigration 
politics. This hinges on them being small countries with very exclusive cultural 
conceptions of national integration compared to Britain's more expansive post-
colonial cosmopolitan nationalism. Britain meanwhile is much better governed and 
has a much more effective welfare state -- also open on more equal terms to its 
migrant workers -- than the more “wild west” informal migration trends of Italy and 
boomtime Spain, all of which has turned very bad in the post-crisis period. Germany's 
structural dependency on manufacturing means its economy has a different kind of 
resilience, but it can eye with envy the much better governed results of open 
migration when compared to the problems of irregularity caused by its longstanding 
refusal to bring down transition barriers to Poles: it got the same migrant workers in 
large numbers, but much worse selection dynamics. France, meanwhile, has been 
nothing but a tale of stumbling sclerosis for years. It saw a generation of its brightest 
and best graduates flee to London as Paris was eclipsed by its binary rival London; 
unable to reform and open up its primary labour markets, immigrants and young 
French people alike were cast into immobile secondary labour market roles, while 
East European migrants were stigmatized, despite being numerically fewer than in 
neighbouring countries. From the point of view of the European Commission, on 
migration, Britain in Europe can only be seen as its star pupil. 
 
Conclusion 
The EU faces a decision of enormous moment with the British deliberation on 
Europe. As I have argued, it threatens to negate the example of a member state which 
has best embodied the radically transformative potential of the fourth freedom, itself 
the most distinctive element of the European regional integration project as a variant 
on globalization. Open EU migration in Britain not only offered a solution to the 
conundrum of an optimal liberal migration scenario, but also a glimpse of its 
cosmopolitan potentials. 
Yet this fact is far from visible. Both in Britain and in continental Europe, there is an 
assumption that Britain is both economically and politically an outlier; even that it is 
not really part of Europe. In Britain meanwhile, there is precious little recognition of 
how much it owes its recent success and power internationally to its geographical 
position; how its relationship with Europe was the secret of its re-ascendence and the 
boom times of “cool Britannia”. The crisis since 2008 shows how much this success 
was effectively monopolized by London and the South East, where during and after 
the Olympics, it has continued to be business as usual, even as anti-Europeanism 
swells across the country. 
Critics of liberal market economies can, from a left-leaning perspective, rightfully 
point to inequities, imbalances and harshness in the British economy. But there is 
little doubt that in terms of economic productivity as well as openness to the benefits 
of freer migration, most of continental Europe would benefit from more not less 
liberalization on this question. Proponents of alternative political economies for 
Europe -- re-imposing strong, top-down, state-governed controls on the factors of 
production and consumption, and labour market restrictions and protections -- should 
own up clearly to the anti-European nationalist implications of their positions, if not 
their latent Marxism. In other words, sloganeering about the evils of “neo-liberalism” 
masks and obscures an honest recognition that European economies in opening 
themselves to regional integration, must necessarily find a new balance between the 
prerogatives of the managed economy, flexible or open labour markets, and the 
privileges of insider communities and citizens. 
 
References 
Anderson, P (2009) The New Old World. London: Verso. 
Borjas, G (1999) Economic research on the determinants of immigration: lessons for the European 
Union. World Bank Technical Paper (438). Washington, DC. 
Caporaso, James and Tarrow, Sidney (2009) 'Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational institutions and the 
transnational embedding of markets'. International Organization 63 (4): 593-620. 
Carens, Joseph (1987) 'Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders'. Review of Politics 49 (2): 251-
73. 
Castles, Stephen (2011) 'Migration. crisis and the global labour market.' Globalizations 8 (3): 311-24. 
Castles, Stephen and Kosack, Godula (1973) Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western 
Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Coleman, David (2011) 'The changing face of Europe' in Jack A. Goldstone et al (eds.) Political 
Demography. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 201-18. 
Crouch, Colin (2011) The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism. Oxford: Polity. 
De Genova, Nicholas and Peutz, Nathalie (eds.) (2010) The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space 
and the Freedom of Movement. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Delanty, Gerard and Rumford, Chris (2005) Rethinking Europe. London: Routledge. 
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1999) The Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Society. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Faist, Thomas (2000) The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social 
Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Favell, Adrian (2008) Eurostars and Eurocities. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Favell, Adrian and Recchi, Ettore (2011) 'Social mobility and spatial mobility' in Adrian Favell and 
Virginie Guiraudon, (eds.) The Sociology of the European Union. London: Palgrave, 50-75. 
Garapich, Michal (2008) 'The migration industry and civil society: Polish immigrants in the United 
Kingdom before and after EU enlargement.' Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34 (5): 735-52. 
Goodhart, David (2013) The British Dream. London: Atlantic. 
Gordon, Ian, Travers, Tony and Whitehead, Christine (2007) The Impact of Recent Immigration on the 
London Economy. Corporation of London, London, UK. 
Hall, Peter. A and David Soskice (eds.) (2001) The Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hall, Peter A. and Lamont, Michèle (eds.) (2013) Social Resilience in the Neo-Liberal Era. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hollifield, James (1992) Immigrants, Markets and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Jensen, Ole and Richardson, Tim (2003) Making European Space. London: Routledge. 
Jileva, Elena (2002) ‘Visas and free movement of labour: the uneven imposition of the EU acquis on 
the accession states.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28 (4): 683-700. 
Koser, Khalid (2007) International Migration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Krissman, Fred (2005) ‘Sin coyote ni patrón: why the “migrant network’ fails to explain international 
migration.’ International Migration Review 39 (1): 4-44. 
Light, Ivan and Gold, Steven (2000) Ethnic Economies. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Majone, Giandomenico (1996) Governing Europe. London: Routledge. 
Maas, Willem. 2007. Creating European Citizens. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Massey, Douglass, Jorge Durand, and Nolan Malone (2002) Beyond Smoke and Mirrors. New York: 
Russell Sage. 
Mau, Steffen (2010) Social Transnationalism. London: Routledge. 
Mau Steffen and Verwiebe, Roland (2010) European Societies. Mapping Structure and Change. 
Bristol: Policy Press. 
Mazower, Mark (1998) Dark Continent. London: Penguin. 
Miller, David (2000) Citizenship and National Identity. Oxford: Polity. 
Mitchell, Katharyn (2003) 'Educating the national citizen in neoliberal times: from the multicultural 
self to the strategic cosmopolitan.' Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 28 (4): 387-403. 
Morawska, Ewa (2002) 'Transnational migration in the enlarged European Union: a perspective from 
East and Central Europe,' in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press,161-90. 
Pastor, Robert (2001) Toward a North American Community. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute. 
Peck, Jamie (2010) Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Piore, Michael (1989) Birds of Passage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Recchi, Ettore and Favell, Adrian (eds.) (2009) Pioneers of European Integration. Worcester: Edward 
Elgar. 
Rigby, Elizabeth and Parker, George (2014) 'David Cameron shelves migration report amid lack of 
evidence', Financial Times, Jan 14. 
Rumford, Chris (2006) 'Theorizing borders', European Journal of Social Theory 9 (2): 155-169. 
Samers, Michael (2004) ‘An emerging geo-politics of ‘illegal’ immigration in the European Union.' 
European Journal of Migration and Law. 6 (1): 23-41. 
Schmidt, Vivien and Thatcher, Mark (eds.) (2013) Resilient Liberalism in Europe's Political Economy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schulz-Forberg, Hagen and Stråth, Bo (2010) The Political History of European Integration. London. 
Routledge. 
Smith, Michael Peter (2001) Transnational Urbanism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu (2012) 'Citizenship, immigration and the European social project: rights and 
obligations of individuality'. British Journal of Sociology 63 (1): 1-21. 
Streeck, Wolfgang (2011) 'The crisis of democratic capitalism'. New Left Review. 71, Sept-Oct. 
Streeck, Wolfgang (2013) Gekaufte Zeit. Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Torpey, John. (2000) The Invention of the Passport, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Urry J (2007) Mobilities. Cambridge: Polity. 
Vertovec S (2007) 'Super-diversity and its implications'. Ethnic and Racial Studies 30 (6): 1024-54. 
Waldinger R (1999) Still the Promised City. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
About the author 
Adrian Favell is Professor of Sociology at Sciences Po, Paris, and the author of 
Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and 
Britain (Palgrave, 1998) and Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility 
in an Integrating Europe (Blackwell, 2008). http://www.adrianfavell.com 
